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Abstract
A recent paper by Aumann [1981] replies to criticisms of the KTU
value raised by Roth [1980] and Shafer [1980], and comments on the
current state of research on the NTU value. This note presents the
argument that the NTU value reflects phenomena which might better be
viewed as belonging to the realm of transferable utility games, rather
than non-transferable utility games. A new example is presented, and
avenues for future research are discussed.

1. Introduction
In an important recent paper, R. J. Aumann [1981] replies in detail
to criticisms of the NTU (non-transferable utility) value (Shapley [1969])
appearing in Roth [1980] and Shafer [1980]. Aumann's response is wide
ranging: he begins by noting that other solution concepts (e.g., the core,
competitive equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium) can give couterintuitive
results, but still retain their analytical value. He argues that the
examples used to criticize the NTU value are simply the same sort of
counterintuitive results. The purpose of this paper is to explain why
I find Aumann's response unpersuasive, and why the NTU value seems to have
important weaknesses not shared by other solution concepts, and arising
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from different causes.
Some of the difference between the NTU value and other solution
concepts arises from the fact that, unlike the NTU value, most other
commonly used solution concepts—e.g., the core, competitive equilibrium,
Nash equilibrium, and even the Shapley [1953] value for transferable
utility games—are defined, or can be rigorously interpreted, in terms
of simple assumptions about the behavior of individuals in simple choice
situations. Part of the analytic usefulness of these concepts derives
from the fact that situations in which they yield counterintuitive results
can be analysed to see why the related individual choice behavior might
3
also be counterintuitive in those situations. The NTU value, in contrast,
has not as yet been given any rigorous interpretation in terms of individual
behavior.
Before going on, it will be helpful to explain the point of view I
take in discussing these matters. I agree with Aumann that economic theory
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isn't mathematics, solution concepts aren't theorems, and that one or
two counterintuitive examples don't destroy a solution concept. Instead,
I think that using any particular solution concept to explore some model
of economic activity is akin in some respects to experimental science.
The starting hypothesis is that the solution concept reliably reflects
underlying economic phenomena, and each model "successfully" analysed is
a data point lending support to that hypothesis . But experimenters also
have to consider competing hypotheses consistent with the data. This
paper will advance such a competing hypothesis about the KTU value.
The competing hypothesis is that the KTU value is a reflection, for
games without transferable utility, of phenomena which occur in games
which do have transferable utility, and which need not in general have
economic meaning in the non-transferable utility case.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the NTU value,
and discusses why the formal behavioral interpretation of the Shapley
value for transferable utility games (Roth [1977a, b]) does not carry
over to the NTU value. Section 3 begins by briefly discussing Aumann's
criticism of the analysis presented in Roth [1980], and goes on to present
a new example to illuminate the issue, and to support the competing
hypothesis discussed above. Section 4 concludes.
2. The relationship between the TU and NTU values
The NTU value for a game without transferable utility is defined to
be equal to the TU value (Shapley [1953]) of a related game in which
utility _is_ transferable. This section considers why we should expect
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to find difficulties in interpreting the NTU value along the customary
lines for interpreting the TU value.
The "value" for games with transferable utility which appears most
widely in the literature was introduced by Shapley [1953]. He proposed
a set of axioms on "value functions" defined on the class of games with
transferable utility, and demonstrated that there was a unique function
satisfying these axioms. The interpretation suggested for this value
function was that it summarized, for each player in each game, the value
of playing the game.
Roth [1977a, b] gave this interpretation a rigorous foundation in a
behavioral context, by showing that the Shapley value could be viewed as
the von Neumann-Morgenstern [1953] utility function of a certain kind
of risk-neutral individual, faced with the choice of positions in a game,
and across games. That is, the Shapley value for a position in a game
reflects its desirability relative to other positions to such a risk-
neutral individual, in the well understood sense captured by von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions.
To understand how the NTU value is related to the TU value, we must
first consider how games without transferable utility (NTU games) are
related to games with transferable utility (TU games). For TU games, a
single number is sufficient to summarize the worth of a coalition, since
the coalition is free to distribute its utility payoffs in any way (so
only the sum of these payoffs is required to represent the set of feasible
payoffs) . It has been recognized since quite early in the history of
game theory that this assumption of unlimited transferability of utility
is highly unrealistic (cf. Luce and Raiffa [1957], Aumann and Peleg [I960])
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In an NTU game, this assumption is not made; a coalition may have different
potential activities which pay different members differently, and it can-
not in general alter the distribution of payoffs. If we were to change
an NTU game into a TU game by somehow allowing utility to be freely
transferred, we would be enlarging the set of feasible payoffs which a
coalition could achieve, to include all possible redistributions of its
'most profitable' activity.
The NTU value is defined as follows. Consider an n-person NTU
game G, and the related TU game g which would result if we assumed
that utility could in fact be freely transferred in the original game G.
This TU game g has a TU value which may or may not be a feasible outcome
in the original NTU game G. If it is, then the NTU value of G is defined
to be equal to the TU value of g. If not, then the game G is transformed
to another game G. , by multiplying the payoffs of each player i by
A
some non-negative number X
.
, and the related TU game g. is considered.
i " A
Shapley [1969] proved via a fixed-point argument that there exists some
non-negative vector A = (A.. A ) such that the TU value of g^ is
feasible in the NTU game G . The corresponding outcome in G is its
A
NTU value: i.e., x = (xn ,...,x ) is the NTU value of G if x is feasible1' n
in G and if (X.x..
,
..
.
, X x ) is the TU value of g,
.
1 1' ' n n X
The key assumption we must therefore make if we are to believe that
the NTU value inherits the principal properties of the TU value is that,
as far as the 'value' of a game is concerned, the NTU game G is equivalent
to the TU game ju .
This assumption can be thought of as consisting of two parts. The
first part is an assumption about the equivalence of games under the
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transformation involved in multiplying the payoffs by the corresponding
components of the vector X. The second part is an assumption about the
equivalence of KTU games and TU games (without needing to modify the
scale of the payoffs).
Concerning the first part of this assumption, it should be noted that
multiplication of the payoffs by a vector X whose components are unequal
destroys the interpretation referred to earlier of the value as a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility for playing a game. The reason is that,
in order for different positions to be comparable to one another, the
payoffs available in each position must be defined in common units. So
we cannot expect that the NTU value will represent the expected utility
of playing each position in a game the way the TU value does.
As to the second part of the assumption— the equivalence from the
point of view of a 'value function' of NTU and TU games— the next section
will address this issue. Some examples will be considered in which this
assumption can be examined without the additional complication of a X-
trans format ion; i.e., examples in which the NTU value requires no re-
scaling (A = (1,1,1)).
3. Discussion of some examples
Let us first consider an example from Roth [1980], whose analysis
there is challenged by Aumann. There are three players: each can get
by himself; players 1 and 2 acting together can achieve the payoff
vector (-j,-j,0); players 1 and 3 together can achieve (p,0,l-p) where p
is some fixed amount strictly less than
-j; players 2 and 3 together
can similarly achieve (0,p,l-p); and all three players acting together
can achieve any division (x
1
,x„,x_) whose components are nonnegative
and sum to 1. Utility is not transferable. In fact, no player can make any
so
-6-
rt "of sidepayment to any other player: for each coalition, only the pay-
offs given above are possible. Aumann [1980] addresses his comments to the
case p = — , and it will be sufficient to consider that case here.
Note that the sum of the payoffs to each coalition is always 1.
So if utility were transferable, the resulting TU game would be the
symmetric game whose TU value is (—
»
-
T,"~) • Since this outcome
is feasible in the NTU game actually being considered, it is therefore
defined to be the NTU value for that game (with X = (1,1,1)).
In Roth [1980] it was argued that, in the idealized cooperative game
c
in which it is common knowledge that all the players are perfectly
rational, the outcome (-r,—,0) had a much better claim, since both
players 1 and 2 prefer this to any other feasible outcome, and since
the rules allow them to achieve it. Aumann [1980] argues that cooperative
9
games can be thought of as modelling less idealized situations, and
that the outcome (-r-,--,0), which gives nothing to player 3, is thus
a much too unforgiving assessment of the game—the NTU value, which
gives each player — , is more forgiving in the sense that it recognizes
a possibility that each player will get something, which cannot be ignored
when the game is not viewed as an idealized model.
In summary, Aumann' s defense of the NTU value in this example revolves
around the argument that it gives to each player a payoff which reflects
the possibility that he might or might not be in the winning coalition,
which cannot be ignored if games are to be taken to represent non-ideal
situations. By contrast, my position is that the NTU value is simply
reflecting the symmetry of the related TU game, in a manner which is
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inappropriate in the (non-symmetric) NTU game. The following example,
which is related to a game studied by Owen [1972] , will help tc illuminate
these two conflicting points of view.
The new example
There are three players: each can assure himself of getting 0; players
1 and 2 acting together can achieve the payoff vector (2,-1,0); players 1
and 3 or players 2 and 3 acting together can achieve only the payoff vector
(0,0,0), and players 1, 2, and 3 acting all together can achieve any payoff
(x.. ,x„,x„) whose components are not less than -1 and which sum to 1.
Utility is not transferable—no sidepayments of any sort are feasible.
Note that, in this game, players 1 and 2 acting together can engage
in an activity with a payoff of 2 to player 1, and -1 to player 2. Since
player 2 can assure himself of a payoff of at least 0, no assumption
other than the individual rationality of player 2 himself is needed to
conclude that players 1 and 2 will not form a coalition to carry out
this activity. No other one or two-player coalition has any productive
activities available to it. Only the three-player coalition has any
individually rational productive activities available to it, and its
potential activities are perfectly symmetric in the payoffs they give to
the players.
For this latter reason, a compelling case could be made that the
outcome (-r,-r-,r-) i-s the most representative of the players' prospects
in this game. At the very7 least, to argue that player 3 should have a
positive payoff it is sufficient to note that n£ individually rational
productive agreement can be reached without his cooperation. Nevertheless,
,1
'2 !the NTU value for this game is the outcome (—,-y, 0) (with A = (1,1,1))
The technical reason for this is clear: if utility were transferable,
player 3 would be a dummy in the corresponding TU game. In that game,
the coalition of players 1 and 2 would have a worth of 1, player 3 would
add nothing, and so he would get nothing at the TU value, which is
(—,—,0). Because this is the TU value in the TU game, it is by
definition also the NTU value in the NTU game.
Lets look a little more closely at this sleight of hand. In the
NTU game, players 1 and 2 can't get together on their own since a side-
payment from 1 to 2 would be required before any joint activity would
be rational for player 2, and such sidepayments are impossible. But
player 3 can act as an intermediary: when he is a member of the coalition
along with 1 and 2, any distribution of the gains from cooperation is
possible e Of course, if it were suddenly possible (as in the TU game)
for player 1 to make sidepayments to player 2, then the services of player
3 would have no value. But to conclude for this reason that player 3's
services are of absolutely no value even when such sidepayments cannot
be made strikes me as absurd. Yet this is what the NTU value does.
The similarity between the two examples discussed above is that both
were chosen to emphasize the great difference which can exist between an NTU
game and the related TU game. This difference is ignored by the NTU
value. The dissimilarity between the two examples is that, loosely
speaking, the roles of the payoff vectors (-7,-7,-7) and (—,—,0)
are reversed. The arguments which Aumann [1980] made for (-7,-7,-7) as
the NTU value of the first example would have to be reversed in the case
of the second example, where it is the NTU value which assigns to the
third player, and which thus reflects no possibility that he will
be part of the "winning coalition".
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Even if some story car. be constructed to simultaneously defend the
NTU value in both games, it would still have to contend with what should
by now be a very plausible competing hypothesis: the NTU value is a
reflection, for NTU games, of the phenomena which occur in the corresponding
TU games, whether or not these phenomena continue to have economic meaning
in the NTU games
.
4. Conclusions
We have considered two alternative hypotheses to account for the
behavior of the NTU value. The "original hypothesis" is that the NTU
value reflects the underlying economics of NTU games in something like
the way the TU value reflects the economics of TU games. According tc
this hypothesis (cf. Aumann [1981]), the fact that examples of the kind
considered here seem counterintuitive results from our present incomplete
understanding of the NTU value; and when in the future we understand it
better, these examples will no longer be disturbing. Viewed in this way,
intuitive results obtained using the NTU value are seen as supporting
evidence for the hypothesis.
The "competing hypothesis" is that, for each NTU game, the NTT' value
generates numbers based on some TU game which may not be sufficiently
similar to the original NTU game to yield meaningful results. According to
this hypothesis, the fact that many intuitive results can be obtained using
the NTU value reflects the fact that TU games can often be used to illuminate
economic phenomena (which is why there is such a large literature concerned
with TU games). Viewed in this way, the counterintuitive examples discussed
earlier are seen as supporting the hypothesis by demonstrating how dissimilar
an NTU game can be from the TU game selected by the NTU value.
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If we accept the competing hypothesis, ve need to consider whether
the NTU value might nevertheless continue to be a valuable tool capable
of often providing some economic insight, even if that insight is into
the economics of TU games. Here we need to be extremely careful. If
we are studying phenomena which we believe can be adequately modelled
by TU games, then it is surely more straightforward to study TU games
directly. And if we are studying phenomena for which the assumption of
transferable utility is sufficiently unrealistic so as to require modelling
by NTU games, then we cannot rely on a solution concept which reinterprets
an NTU game as a TU game.
So what can be said at this point about the status of the two alter-
native hypotheses? While I believe that the preponderance of the evidence
at this point lies with the competing hypothesis, these are clearly the
kinds of issues for which we cannot expect a completely "clean" resolution.
And even someone who is persuaded by the arguments I have presented here
would be foolish not to be impressed by the fact that it is no less a
champion than Aumann who rises to the defense of the NTU value. So what
does all this mean for future research on the NTU value?
It seems to me that two avenues of research present themselves as
likely candidates to those hoping to find supporting evidence for the
original hypothesis. The first of these is research into the foundations
of the NTU value, aimed at finding some rigorous behavioral interpretation,
which might help us understand counterintuitive examples for the NTU value
the way we understand them for other solution concepts (cf. footnote 3).
Of course, a likely outcome to this line of research is that it would
12
lead to changes in the definition of the NTU value. ' The second of
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these avenues is research aimed at using the NTU value to identify
important economic phenomena which occur in KTU games but not in TU
games. This would also tend to weaken the competing hypothesis. In the
meantime, however, and as long as the competing hypothesis remains viable,
there is reason to regard with some suspicion the results of using the
NTU value to analyse models of economic interaction in which utility
cannot be transferred, since these results may offer only an imperfect
reflection of phenomena which occur in games with transferable utility.
In closing, I can't resist observing that "philosophical" discussions
like Aumann [1980] and that attempted here occupy a set of almost measure
zero in the open literature. This is perhaps a comment on an aspect of
the sociology of our profession: since statements about the usefulness
and plausibility of mathematical ideas aren't themselves mathematical
statements, there isn't much space devoted to them in the mathematical
literature; and since these ideas are of primary interest to mathematical
economists, there isn't much attention to them in the non-mathematical
literature either. There is thus a paucity of the kind of meta-theoretical
discussion which might help to guide theoretical work.
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Footnotes
Roth [1980] criticized not only the NTU value, but also a closely
related concept due to Karsanyi [1963], [1977], which Shapley [1969, p. 260]
cites as the motivation for the NTU value. However, since Aumann directs
his comments at the NTU value, and since Harsanyi [1980] has indicated
substantial agreement with the conclusions of Roth [1980], the comments
in this paper will be directed at the NTU value alone.
2
*"0f course, this rejoinder expresses my own views only, and does
not speak for other critics of the NTU value. And it goes without saying
that the purpose of this kind of criticism is not to discourage research
on the NTU value and related matters, but to suggest directions in which
further research might be fruitful, and provide a guide to interpreting
its results.
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Consider, for example, the famous example which Aumann draws to our
attention of a market with one buyer and two sellers. Both the core and
the competitive equilibrium assign all the benefits of trade in this game
to the buyer, and none to the sellers. Even if we find this prediction
counterintuitive, we can still note that if the sellers engaged in the
kind of cutthroat competition presumed by the core (through the definition
of what constitutes a dominated outcome) or the competitive equilibrium,
then the buyer would indeed be able to play them off against one another
to obtain as close to all of the benefits from trade as he liked. It is
precisely this fact which gives the sellers some incentive to show restraint
in their competition with one another, and which causes us to find the
original prediction counterintuitive.
Individuals who are not risk neutral will have different utility
functions. See Roth [1977b].
The NTU value is also called the A-transfer value , in recognition
of the fact that it comes from the TU game g , in which utility is
transferable at "exchange rates" given by the vector A. A nice
discussion of this can be found in Aumann [1975].
The equivalence of games under the A-transformation can also
be questioned on empirical grounds, which is briefly referred to in
footnote 10.
However it is worth keeping in mind that the NTU value makes
the same prediction for any value of p, and the criticism of the value
discussed in Roth [1980] applies for values of p less than — . The
case p = provides a particularly clear test of the NTU value, and the
comments of Aumann [1980] do not appear to address this case.
o
In the sense of Aumann [1976] and Milgrom [1981].
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9
Aumann first models the game as a noncocperative game in which
pair's of players have random access tc each other, ir. secret. He also
briefly considers an analogy to the coalition forming process which follows
parliamentary elections.
Let me clarify my point of view on the subject of when cooperative
games of the kind considered are appropriately viewed as modelling "ideal"
interactions among "perfectly rational" players. It seems to me that one of
the principal goals of game theory is to study perfectly rational behavior
in ideal conditions precisely in order to provide a benchmark against
which theory and observation about actual economic behavior can be measured.
(One of the most eloquent explanations of the use of idealized models in
game theory is the discussion of how to model perfect competition given by
Aumann [1964].) At the same time, it is obviously of enormous importance
to study how real people interact in economic situations which approximate
the idealized models. For this purpose, empirical observation seems to me
to be an essential element. In this context it is worth noting that there
is very strong experimental evidence against the assumption made in the
definition of the KTU value, that games are equivalent under the A-transfer
procedure. For a survey of the experimental results on this subject for
simple bargaining games, see Roth and Kalouf [1979]; some more recent re-
sults are contained in Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan [1981], Roth and Malouf
[1982], and Roth and Murnighan [1982].
In general, if the game is taken to represent a variety of
possible realizations, it seems very difficult to justify that the NTU
value reflects no possibility that player 3 will get any benefit, even
though no agreements can be reached without his cooperation.
12
One promising effort in the direction of such an overhaul
of the definition is the work of Hart and Kurz [1981], which directly
addresses questions raised in Roth [1980].
M/C/279
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